1. FOLLOW UP ON NORTH KOREAN ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA
  2. AMBO MUNITIONS FACTORY - RETOOLING AWAY FROM NORTH KOREA
  3. ETHIOPIAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS IMPOSE LAST-MINUTE IMPEDIMENTS ON ARMS INQUIRY ON NORTH KOREA
  4. DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/26/08

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR MASS MCAP KN ET
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MELES ON NORTH KOREAN ARMS
RELATIONSHIP

REF: A. STATE 124866
¶B. ADDIS 1743
¶C. STATE 72005

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (A), (B), and
(D).

FOLLOW UP ON NORTH KOREAN ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA
--------------------------------------------- ---
1. (S/NF) Ambassador and ORA chief met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles on December 10 in follow-up to prior meetings on North Korean relations. The Ambassador expressed appreciation for opening up Ethiopia's munitions factory in Ambo, which operates in connection with North Korea, to a visit by the U.S. Embassy on December 18. The visit will help the U.S. assess the composition and scope of the munitions factory in order for Washington to provide information to the Ethiopian government on opportunities to retool the factory and to advise on what other countries might be able to replace North Korea in the provision of munitions. The issue remains, as the Prime Minister noted for the Secretary during her visit to Addis Ababa on December 5, that North Korea is able to help Ethiopia produce munitions cheaply in comparison to other countries. The cost of retooling could be very expensive and impact negatively on Ethiopia's military capabilities at a time that it is dispatching troops to Darfur for UN-AU peacekeeping, maintaining troops in peace keeping operations in Liberia, counter insurgency operations in the Ogaden and stabilization efforts in Somalia.


AMBO MUNITIONS FACTORY - RETOOLING AWAY FROM NORTH KOREA
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶2. (S/NF) The Prime Minister raised questions about UNSC resolution 1718 on sanctions on receiving North Korean assistance. The Prime Minister said the Ambo plant and cooperation with North Korea has two purposes: 1) production of munitions, not only for small arms but also some rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and BM-21 (truck mounted rocket launchers), and 2) enhancing the capability of AK 47 rifles. Thus far, Meles said, North Korea has not met its promise to transfer technology on the AK 47 upgrade. North Korean officials noted to the Ethiopian Government (GoE) that they are awaiting parts from North Korea. Prime Minister Meles noted that Russia would not transfer the technology, or at least, the cost was too prohibitive. North Korea was willing to transfer technology on how to upgrade the AK 47 at a very low cost. So far, Meles added, North Korea has only honored production of hundreds rather than the promised 10,000 advanced AK 47 rifles.

¶3. (S/NF) The Prime Minister explained that Ethiopia could suspend the ammunition, BM-21, and AK 47 upgrade production if the UN sanctions prohibit this program. This would severely constrain the Ethiopian military forcing them to rehabilitate older AK 47 in Ethiopia's inventory or purchase weapons. The munitions production can be continued without North Korean assistance, but the issue would be quality. The Prime Minister questioned whether North Korean assistance with technology transfer or technology training would be prohibited under UN sanctions. The Ambassador said he would return with an answer. The Prime Minister commented that in addition to the Ambo plant, North Korea had an engineer working at the Ministry of Water.


COMMENT
-------

¶4. (S/NF) The Ambo factory visit will probably be an initial visit. Prime Minister Meles raised the issue of an American expert visiting the plant because of his hope that the U.S. can provide financial support in retooling the plant, help with munitions technology, and suggest possible alternate imports sourcing. The Prime Minister was forthcoming in his remarks to the Ambassador, as well as to the Secretary last week, of Ethiopia's desire to be in compliance with UNSC resolution 1718, which would entail severe challenges to Ethiopia's military in meeting its counter insurgency operations and peacekeeping responsibilities. In addition to the Ambo factory, Post will continue to investigate the full scope of North Korean defense and commercial activities throughout Ethiopia. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO

ETHIOPIAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS IMPOSE LAST-MINUTE IMPEDIMENTS ON ARMS INQUIRY ON NORTH KOREA


08ADDISABABA87 2008-01-14 04:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Addis Ababa

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARAGRAPH MARKINGS
NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2018
TAGS: PARM MARR PREL KN ET
SUBJECT: (C) DEFENSE OFFICIALS IMPOSE LAST-MINUTE
IMPEDIMENTS ON ARMS INQUIRY ON NORTH KOREA

REF: A. 07 ADDIS 3528
¶B. 06 ADDIS 3223
¶C. STATE 124866

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (S/NF) Despite Prime Minister Meles' apparent receptivity to discussing Ethiopia's arms supply relationship with North Korea (Ref A) as well as discussion with the Secretary during her visit, Ethiopia's Chief of Defense Staff (CHOD), General Samora Yonus, adamantly opposes U.S. scrutiny of Ethiopian munitions factories connected with North Korea or any other country, and dismissed U.S. concerns over North Korea-Ethiopia ties arguing that these are productive and not in violation of international agreements. General Samora was emphatic in stressing that North Korean arms are inexpensive and North Korean help with arms manufacturing will allow Ethiopia to meet its obligations in UN peacekeeping missions and its strategic interests in Somalia. The General criticized the Ambassador personally for delays in the provision of U.S. support for operations in Somalia and urged support for their UNPKO deployments.


¶2. (S) Over the past month, Ambassador has pursued a visit to the North Korean-supported arms and munitions factory in Ambo. While the Ambo visit would have provided unprecedented first-hand observation of the largest North Korean-supported arms factory in country, it would have primarily provided a frank and direct dialogue between our two countries on the scope, nature and future of the Ethiopian-North Korean arms relationship and its effect on U.S.-Ethiopian ties. While the cancellation of the visit and the military's new-found tough stance on this issue highlights the opportunity lost to raise this issue in depth, the Ambassador will personally pursue this issue in depth with the Foreign and Prime Ministers in coming weeks. End Summary.


THE AMMO IN AMBO IS NOT TO BE SEEN
----------------------------------

¶3. (S) In response to sustained general expressions of concern about the Ethiopia-North Korea arms relationship with senior Ethiopian Government (GoE) officials, the Ministry of National Defense in November agreed to take an Embassy team and a Washington-based USG expert to see the North Korean-supported arms and munitions factory in Ambo. Just days before the December 18 planned visit, State Minister for Defense Sultan Mohammed -- Post's principle defense interlocutor on the North Korean arms relationship -- unexpectedly resigned his position. Despite a Diplomatic Note to Post in mid-December noting that the visit would be postponed, upon pursuit of rescheduling the visit, the Ethiopian military's (ENDF) international relations officer Gen. Hassan informed Acting DATT on December 28 that the visit was canceled. Gen. Hassan stated that whatever relationship with North Korea existed in Ambo was technical and minimal, and therefore not worth all this attention and U.S. concern. He added that at a practical level, Ethiopia simply needed to keep this factory running to the degree possible to assure the ENDF supply of small arms munitions, but that the quantities produced were minimal and did not even suffice to ensure a proper supply for the ENDF.

¶4. (S/NF) In following up on the visit's cancellation, Ambassador called on Defense Minister (DefMin) Kuma Demeksa and Chief of Defense Staff (CHOD) Gen. Samora Yonus on January 3 and 4 respectively. Ambassador expressed his understanding of Ethiopia's orientation toward North Korea as a low price source for arms and munitions in light of inexpensive imports and the on-going production at North Korean-supported factories in Ethiopia, but noted the parameters of UNSC resolution 1718. Ambassador noted that the U.S. interest in the relationship stems from the U.S. desire to assist Ethiopia to maintain necessary and affordable access to military materiel while avoiding sanctions and coming into compliance with its United Nations obligations. In response to the Ambassador's request to reschedule the Ambo factory visit, DefMin noted that "we know that the United States is helping us and that we have work to do" but immediately asked what support the Ambassador could promise following the visit. The Ambassador replied that while the visit would show the GoE's commitment to moving toward complying with UNSCR 1718, it would also allow the USG to provide advice on alternate sourcing and factory refurbishment options. DefMin noted that there would be no problem with the visit if Ethiopia were to get technology or financial assistance from it, but otherwise advised the Ambassador to raise the issue with the CHOD. Gen. Samora aggressively cut off the Ambassador during his presentation and said that he would only allow Post to "inspect" that Ambo facility if he received a written directive from the Prime Minister. Samora noted that the ENDF "is working with North Korea, and will continue to do so, because they are cheap." Samora admitted that the ENDF has been relying on North Korean arms and is dependent on them, even for maintenance. They continue the established relationship with North Korea, however, because they are helping to build Ethiopia's capacity, which will reduce Ethiopia's dependence on North Korean supplies and technical assistance.


¶5. (S) As evidence of Ethiopia's focus on developing national capacity to replace dependence on outside sourcing, Gen. Samora noted that the "North Koreans have now finished their work and are leaving" the Gafat factory near Debre Zeit, noting that the ENDF can now produce AK-47s fully themselves. Now, Chinese workers are in Debre Zeit to overhaul tanks, he continued, which also boosts Ethiopian capacity. Samora claimed that Ethiopia has not purchased arms for import form North Korea since a shipment was lost in a ship fire in the Spring (see Ref B for initial reporting). Now we are only buying skills from the North Korea, and will continue to do so, Samora repeated, because it is cheap.

THE WAY FORWARD
---------------

¶6. (C) While pursuit of the site visit to the Ambo factory offered an attractive forum for a robust discussion and first-hand observation of a manifestation of the Ethiopia-North Korea arms relationship, its cancellation is evidence of the diversion that the offer of a factory visit really represented from Post's pursuit of this issue. Post is now developing a non-paper on this issue -- which it will clear with ISN -- for the Ambassador to present privately to senior GoE interlocutors in discussions on this issue in coming weeks. The non-paper will lay out Ethiopia's obligations under UNSC resolution 1718, the Administration's reporting requirements under the INKSNA legislation, and the possible implications of Ethiopia's current relationship with North Korea. The non-paper will go on to note the USG's willingness to assist Ethiopia in finding potential alternate sources for its North Korean arms imports and to advise on refitting the existing North Korean-supported arms and munitions factories in Ethiopia. In discussing the matter with Foreign Minister Seyoum and Prime Minister Meles, the Ambassador will explicitly pursue details included in Ref C on the scope and nature of current imports of arms, munitions, and related materiel from North Korea, the extent and nature of North Korean technical assistance in support of arms and related production in Ethiopia, the uses and possible export of materiel produced in Ethiopia with North Korean assistance, and Ethiopia's plan to diversify fully away from dependence on North Korean supplies and assisted production. Post will continue, however, to pursue the possibility of a visit to the Ambo facility as well as the factory in Debre Zeit.


COMMENT
-------

¶7. (S/NF) The Ambassador and Post assess that the arguments posed by Prime Minister Meles in Ref A and to the Secretary on Dec. 5 -- that Ethiopia maintains its current arms sourcing and production assistance relationship with North Korea because it is cheap and due to the sunk costs invested in the North Korean-supported Ethiopian factories -- are genuine. Further, Gen. Samora's argument of the ENDF's continued reliance on North Korea as a means to establish and develop Ethiopian capacity to operate the existing arms and munitions factories in country is fully consistent with similar local capacity arguments Samora has invoked on unrelated, less-sensitive matters. Gen. Samora's self-contradictory comments about the North Korean relationship -- alternating between "we will continue to source from North Korea" and "we haven't sourced from North Korea in the past year" as well as "the North Koreans have left" and "some of the North Koreans may still be around" -- suggest his fundamental unwillingness to be forthcoming with us on this relationship. In light of Gen. Samora's hawkish, yet near-peer, standing vis-a-vis Prime Minister Meles within the Central Committee of Ethiopia's ruling TPLF party and Prime Minister Meles' dependence on Samora for support within the Central Committee, it would be unlikely that Meles would reverse Samora's decision. Still, Ambassador and Post believe that the GoE political leaders, including the Foreign and Prime Ministers, will provide a more complete and forthcoming disclosure of the nature, scope, and future of the Ethiopia-North Korea arms sourcing relationship. Ambassador and Post will pursue those discussions in the coming weeks.

YAMAMOTO
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/26/08


INDEX:

(1) Interim report on Aegis destroyer's collision accident brings chain of blunders to light (Asahi)

(2) Hegemony adrift (Part 1): North Korea exports arms to Ethiopia; Putting high priority on fight against Al Qaeda, U.S. winks at contradictions (Mainichi)

(3) China's multilateral diplomacy: "Fighting spirit" exposed (Yomiuri)

(4) Interview with Australian Prime Minister Rudd by Yoichi Funabashi: Why is he bypassing Japan on his first overseas trip since taking office? (Asahi)

MAINICHI (Top play and Page 2) (Abridged slightly) March 25, 2008 By Keiichi Shirato, Addis Ababa

An arms factory named Hormat Engineering Factory sits at some 135 kilometers west of Ethiopia's capital of Addis Ababa. According to a female off-duty soldier attached to a checkpoint near the factory, approximately 200 Ethiopian and North Korean live-in engineers and employees work there. The factory was build during the Mengistu socialist administration (1974-1991) with assistance from North Korea. After the Mengistu administration collapsed, a decision was made to turn the factory into a household goods factory. Following the territorial conflict with Eritrea in 1998-2000 in which Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia, yet another decision was made to rebuild it as an arms factory. North Korea undertook the rebuilding project and provided military supplies.

Situated inland, Ethiopia has no seaport. In landing military supplies from North Korea, three ports in Somaliland, which has declared independent of Somalia, were used for a total of four times between January and July 2007, according to Somaliland authorities.

At one of the three ports of the Saylac district, unloading work was conducted in a curfew under strict surveillance by Ethiopian soldiers and agents.

A nearby resident said:
"There was something like a liquid storage tank. After the work, air smelled like eggs and some residents showed cold-like symptoms for two weeks."

Military supplies from North Korea were also unloaded at two districts in the suburb of Somaliland's largest city of Barbera and were transported to the factory in Ethiopia by rail.

Obtaining information via diplomatic channels that Ethiopia was importing arms from North Korea, the United States and Britain hurried to confirm it. Eritrean Ambassador to Japan Estifanos indicated that chemical weapons were also included in the shipments from North Korea.

Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) has concluded that the supplies from North Korea were most likely raw materials for conventional weapons using phosphorus that can easily be mistaken for chemical weapons. They think the factory in Ethiopia is a facility to produce yellow phosphorus smoke bombs, rocket bombs, and fire arms.

The Ethiopian government released a statement on April 13, 2007, admitting that North Korean cargo ships had transported to Ethiopia machine components and raw materials for small arms ammunition for the arms factory in the country.

Despite that, the United States did not slap sanctions on Ethiopia.

To the United States, Ethiopia is an important point in East Africa in the war on terror. The United States is supporting Ethiopia in a bid to prevent anarchic Somalia from becoming a base of the Al Qaeda, the international terrorist group. Silent approval for North Korea's arms exports reflects the United States' foreign and security policies that give top priority to the war on terrorism.

On November 8, 2007, seven months after Ethiopia admitted to importing military supplies from North Korea, Eritrean Ambassador to Japan Estifanos visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Ambassador Estifanos told a senior MOFA official:
"We are deeply concerned that North Korea has been exporting strategically vital weapons to Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are important trade routes for the international community, including Japan. The safety of those routes is being threatened."

The ambassador also proposed that Japan jointly address the North Korean arms export issue.

Eritrea, which is hostile toward Ethiopia, supports the Islamic Courts Union, Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia. Hitting on America's double standard of winking at arms exports by a state sponsor of terrorism (namely North Korea) for the sake of the war on terrorism against Islamic fundamentalists, Ambassador Estifanos proposed Japan, which has the abduction issue, to join forces against North Korea and Ethiopia.

On December 18, 2007, Eritrea voted for a UN General Assembly resolution (jointly presented by Japan, the United States and European nations) demanding immediate return of abductees from North Korea. Many African countries, such as Ethiopia, abstained from the vote or opposed the resolution for fear of drawing fire over their own human rights situations.

Ethiopia's admission of military supply imports from North Korea and America's silent approval for them created a sensation among people connected with foreign affairs. George Mason University Associate Professor Terrence Lyons, an expert on East African affairs, said: "Given the bad state of U.S.-DPRK relations, it was a surprise." An African diplomatic source also noted: "In recent years, I have never heard of a country that had officially admitted to military trade with North Korea."

Meanwhile, the United States is stepping up its anti-Eritrean stance. In a press conference on August 17, 2007, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Fraser warned: "If Eritrea continues to behave as in the past, we will have to consider (labeling the country a state sponsoring terrorism)." She also touched on the possibility of closing down the Eritrean Consulate General in the United States by citing the country's support for Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia.

National Security Council Senior Director for African Affairs Bobby Pittman also expressed concerns over Eritrea to a senior MOFA official when he visited Washington last year.

Associate Professor Lyons noted: "The United States will probably take certain steps toward countries trying to strengthen security relations with Eritrea."

As a U.S. ally, Japan cannot positively respond to Eritrea's proposal. Ambassador Estifanos complained, "There has been no reply from Japan." Arms exports to Ethiopia have been helping Kim Jong Il maintain his regime by becoming a source of foreign currency.